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Although international refugee law was designed to provide surrogate protection to 
people fleeing persecution, it creates situations in which a person cannot be 
returned and, simultaneously, cannot be accepted. It is unfruitful to approach the 
problem through traditional legal concepts. This is not a practical gap, but a 
conceptual one, caused by the way we think the relationship between sovereignty, 
territory and life. Giorgio Agamben defines this relationship through the concept of 
“sovereign ban.” I argue that international refugee law reproduces the “sovereign 
ban’s” modes of operation, leaving asylum-seekers in the ambiguous position of 
being included, but excluded at the same time; inside a state’s territory, but outside 
the protection of the state’s legal-political order. The structural failure of the 
discourse of refugee law opens space for individualized humanitarian protection. 
However, the discretionary space of humanitarianism may likewise be fulfilled by 
unconstrained manifestations of sovereign violence. Re-thinking the conceptual 
scheme that connects sovereignty, territory and life is a crucial step for a fully 
inclusive system of refugee protection. 
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Apesar de ter sido criado para dar proteção subsidiária a vítimas de perseguição, o 
direito internacional dos refugiados cria situações em que pessoas não podem ser 
mandas de volta aos seus países de origem, mas, ao mesmo tempo, não podem ser 
aceitas pelo país recebedor. Analisar o problema a partir de conceitos jurídicos 
tradicionais é infrutífero. Não se trata de uma brecha prática, mas de uma 
conceitual, causada pela forma que pensamos as relações entre soberania, território 
e vida. Giorgio Agamben define esta relação através do conceito de “bando 
soberano”. Eu argumento que o direito dos refugiados reproduz o modus operandi 
do “bando soberano”, deixando os que buscam asilo na posição ambígua de serem 
incluídos e excluídos ao mesmo tempo; dentro do território de um estado, mas fora 
da proteção da ordem jurídica deste estado. A falha estrutural do discurso do direito 
dos refugiados abre espaço para proteção humanitária individualizada. Entretanto, o 
espaço discricionário do humanitarismo também pode ser ocupado por 
manifestações irrestritas de violência. Repensar o esquema conceitual que conecta 
soberania, território e vida é um passo fundamental para um sistema de proteção a 
refugiados que seja totalmente inclusivo. 
 




International refugee law was designed to provide surrogate protection to people 
fleeing persecution. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention establishes the thresholds for 
the acquisition of refugee status. The scopes of these standards and the 
corresponding burdens of proof have been trusted to each state-party’s legislative 
or judicial system. Once declared refugee by the national authority, the asylum-
seeker is entitled to a comprehensive list of rights guaranteed by the Convention.2  
Within this system of international protection, not every asylum-seeker actually 
fleeing persecution acquires refugee status. Many are victims of human rights 
violations not related to one of the Convention’s “reasons of persecution,” and many 
others are not capable of meeting the burdens of proof determined by national legal 
systems. To cover these gaps, international human rights instruments and judicial 
                                                          
2 The majority of the Convention’s text involves a list of rights that includes social rights, such as the 
right to work (Article 17 to 19) and the access to housing (Article 21) and education (Article 22).  
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or quasi-judicial interpretations of their texts have developed mechanisms of 
complementary protection. They work as second chances for asylum-seekers to 
obtain some sort of international protection.  
Nevertheless, although those second chances entail the right not to be returned to a 
country where there is risk of persecution, they do not necessarily confer a legal 
status, meaning that their beneficiaries are not entitled to a protected set of rights. 
Furthermore, even when a country or the European Union, for example, confers 
such a status, “exclusion clauses” make sure that not everyone in the need for 
protection actually acquires it. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze this problem through the conceptual framework 
created by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Although Agamben’s 
philosophical project aims at the exposure of a hidden ontology of Western politics3 
– based on what he calls the “sovereign ban” -, finding phenomenological 
manifestations of that metaphysical experiment is an indispensible task in 
theoretical and political perspectives.  
On the one hand, the theory would not hold without minimum empirical 
observation. Concrete historical and contemporary manifestations of that hidden 
ontology provide evidence of its existence. On the other, according to the author 
himself, it is our political responsibility to “learn how to recognize this structure of 
ban in the political relations and public spaces in which we live.”4 In this sense, the 
theory must be used as a critical tool in academic and political discourse.          
Agamben has employed his conceptual framework to criticize American foreign 
policy5 and the situation of refugees.6 In this paper, I develop the latter objective 
                                                          
3 What Addison has called a “metaphysical thought experiment” (ADDISON, Simon. Book Review of 
Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory's Edge, edited by Prem Kumar Rajaram and 
Carl Grundy-Warr. Journal of Refugee Studies 21: 414-41, 2008). 
4 AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: O poder soberano e a vida nua I. Belo Horizonte: Editora 
UFMG, 2004, p. 117. 
5 AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Estado de Exceção. São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial, 2003, p. 14. 
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with more empirical consistency. I contend that international and European legal 
discourses on refugee protection reproduce the “sovereign ban’s” modes of 
operation. Their gaps cannot be cognized through traditional legal and political 
standpoints. The problem is more than the insufficiency of current protection 
schemes. It represents the failure of the way in which we think the relationship 
between sovereignty, territory and life. Applying Agamben’s conceptual framework 
opens the possibility of re-thinking this relationship in order to imagine a fully 
inclusive system of international protection, still to be imagined by academics and 
policy-makers.     
 
1. SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORY AND LIFE 
According to Agamben, the original political relation between sovereign power and 
life is not a contract, but the ban.7 The “sovereign ban” operates through the “logic 
of exclusion/inclusion,” which is characterized by the double movement of removing 
subjects from the legal-political order and “re-capturing” them in “camps,” where 
they are destined to become “bare lives.”8 
“Bare life” is pure biological life, which has been differentiated throughout the 
history of Western thought from political life. Agamben de-historicizes the 
Foucaultian thesis about the politicization of biological life by arguing that the 
production of “bare life” is, in fact, the original function of sovereignty. The 
sovereign fulfils this function through what Carl Schmitt has called the decision on 
the “state of exception,” creating a situation of anomie in which unconstrained 
manifestations of violence are possible. This is the hidden foundation of the rupture 
between territory and juridical-political order that has become clearer with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
6 AGAMBEN, Giorgio. We Refugees. Symposium No. 49(2), Summer, 1995, pp. 114-119.  
7 AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: O poder soberano e a vida nua I, pp. 115-116. 
8 AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: O poder soberano e a vida nua I, p. 85. 
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increasing utilization of the “state of exception” as a technique of government in our 
time.9  
The “camp” is the spatial manifestation of this rupture, where the “state of 
exception” becomes the rule and “bare life” is produced. For Agamben, the “camp,” 
not the city, is the biopolitical paradigm of the West. The specificity of our time is 
the expansion of a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, as the “state of 
exception” exceeds its spatial-temporal frontiers, making every location potentially 
a “camp” and every subject potentially “bare life.”      
Concepts like “sovereign ban,” “bare life” and “camp” have been employed to 
analyze concrete problems by Agamben himself and others. The situation of 
refugees arguably has been the most common empirical target of this kind of 
analysis.10 However, frequently authors do not ask themselves about the adequacy 
of this conceptual framework to their object of study or about the difficulties 
involving the concretization of this complex theory. Although in a very superficial 
way – due to space constrains –, I will shortly address these two issues for the sake 
of consistency. 
The Agambenian framework is adequate to approach refugee related problems 
because it denies conceptual structures that are empirically challenged by these 
problems. For instance, refugees empirically challenge the concept of “citizenship” 
as a description of the connection between subject and juridical-political order. In 
their country of legal citizenship, they cannot exercise even the most basic rights 
that constitute the core content of this concept. In the receiving state, they do not 
                                                          
9 AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Estado de Exceção, p. 13. 
10 The examples are numerous, ranging from anthropology (TICKTIN, Miriam. Policing and 
Humanitarianism in France: Immigration and the Turn to Law as State of Exception. Interventions, 
Vol. 7(3), 347-368, 2005) to geography (RJARAM & GRUNDY-WARR (eds.). Borderscapes: Hidden 
Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge. Twin Cities: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.). 
Legal studies, however, have not taken the empirical step in this kind of analysis yet. Authors such as 
Zartaloudis use Agamben in a rather philosophical perspective (ZARTALOUDIS, Thanos. Giorgio 
Agamben: Power, Law and the Uses of Criticism. New York: Ed. Routledge-Cavendish, 2009). 
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have legal citizenship and even when a legal status is conferred upon them, in 
practice it is usually hard to enjoy “citizenship” in a broader sense.  
Thus the idea of “bare life” seems helpful. It allows us to imagine a relationship 
between subject and juridical-political order that does not entail civil, political or 
social rights, and yet does not preclude the use of sovereign violence against the 
subject; a relationship in which the idea of belonging – crucial to the concept of 
“citizenship” – is blurred by the indistinction between inside and outside.     
Another conceptual structure denied by Agamben and empirically challenged by 
refugee related issues concerns the connection between territory and juridical-
political order. The typical locations of asylum-seekers – such as detention camps, 
airport waiting zones and offshore processing areas11 – defy the concept of 
“jurisdiction.” Wherever they might geographically stand, they are inside a juridical-
political order in the sense that they are managed, administered and coercively 
stabilized by the receiving state; but, paradoxically, they are simultaneously outside 
this order because rights and procedural guarantees do not apply to these locations.  
Therefore the concept of “camp” – the spatial manifestation of the state of 
exception – appears to be more adequate for analyzing such ambiguous spaces. The 
“camp” suggests a non-stable relationship between order and territory; a 
relationship that cannot be described through the distinction inside/outside. For 
Agamben, any territory in which there is a de facto suspension of the legal order is 
a camp, but the concept may also refer to an imaginary location. In this paper, I 
analyze the location of non-returnable persons in geographical, conceptual and legal 
terms. While geography separates state of origin and receiving state, law separates 
spaces of subjectivity within the geographical boundaries of the receiving state.        
Assuming that this is enough to justify the application of the concepts of “bare life” 
and “camp” to empirical problems related to the situation of refugees, I shall 
                                                          
11 These are areas constructed in the countries of origin in order to prevent illegal entrance and to 
bypass international obligations. 
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address the difficulty in empirically using the concept of “sovereign ban.” Finding 
the “sovereign” is in itself a difficult task. We may locate it in the Parliament, the 
President, the “people”, or in all three at the same time, but one of the most 
important consequences of the rise of representative democracies and legal 
positivism for political theory has been the difficulty in locating the holder of 
sovereign power. Carl Schmitt, for example, attributed this contemporary invisibility 
of sovereignty to liberal theories of law, such as Hans Kelsen’s impersonal scientific 
objectivism, which traces the chain of legal validity to a hypothetical Grundnorm.12  
Nonetheless, we may argue that the concrete results of the sovereign’s work – the 
decisions that coerce and influence people’s behavior – are observable. Therefore, 
by looking at them, even if we still cannot say for sure where or who the sovereign 
concretely is, we may determine how sovereignty operates. In this sense, 
Agamben’s concept of “sovereign ban” seems reliable precisely because it concerns 
sovereignty’s mode of operation, not its empirical location.13 If sovereign decisions 
about refugees operate through the “logic of inclusion/exclusion,” then the use of 
the concept of “sovereign ban” is justifiable.           
In the following sections, I will approach the gaps and exclusions of international 
refugee law through this conceptual framework. I analyze sovereign decisions from 
international and European refugee law texts and their interpretations by judicial 
and quasi-judicial institutions. Although they cannot be traced back to a single 
sovereignty, my hypothesis is that they reproduce in the international and regional 
spheres sovereignty’s modes of operation – i.e., the logic of the “sovereign ban.”14  
   
                                                          
12 “Now the machine runs by itself,” wrote Schmitt in Political Theology (SCHMITT, Carl. Political 
Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985).  
13 In fact, for Agamben, it is a very fluid location, ranging from administrative officials and policemen 
to doctors and scientists. 
14 Taking Agamben’s theory to a supranational level is a further challenge of this analysis. Approaching 
the origins of these refugee law rules would require research on the workings of the UN’s and the EU’s 
lawmaking arenas, and on individual states’ diplomatic strategies. 
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2. NON-RETURNABLE PERSONS          
The rules of non-refoulement – or non-return – are paramount to international 
refugee and human rights protection. Although legal scholars have called those 
norms principles in order to denote their centrality to international refugee law,15 
their structure is more akin to that of rules. Rules of non-return create negative 
obligations of not returning someone to a country of persecution or general 
inhuman circumstances. Nonetheless, they do not require the receiving state to 
confer a legal status upon those “not returned.”  
The only internationally mandatory protected status is the one regulated by the 
1951 Refugee Convention. The Convention determines (1) who is entitled to refugee 
status; and (2) what is the content of this status. The situation of “non-returnable 
persons” is a result of the difference between the factual predicates of the rules of 
non-refoulement explicitly and implicitly present in human rights instruments and 
the factual predicate of the 1951 Convention’s rule that confers refugee status.   
Rules of command have a double structure characterized by the factual predicate 
and the consequent. The factual predicate determines the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of a rule. The consequent prescribes the consequences 
that follow from the verification of those conditions. A rule’s structure is represented 
by the following sentence: “If factual predicate, then consequent.”16  
In a rule of non-refoulement, the consequent is the prohibition of returning 
someone to his or her country of origin, where the person would suffer violations of 
human rights. Its structure is “if factual predicate, then prohibition to return.” In a 
rule that confers a certain legal status, such as the rule in Article 1 of the 1951 UN 
                                                          
15 For example in PIRJOLA, Jari. Shadows in Paradise – Exploring Non-Refoulement as an Open 
Concept. International Journal of Refugee Law, December 2007; 19: 639 – 660, in which the 
author explores the openness of the concept of non-refoulement in international law. Authors in 
general reproduce the language used by the UNHCR, the UN refugee agency. 
16 SCHAUER, Frederick. Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based 
Decision-Making in Law and in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
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Refugee Convention, the consequent is the acquirement of that status. Its structure 
is “if factual predicate, then acquisition of status.”  
International protection is only complete when there is a combination of non-
refoulement and protected status. This combination generates a “double inclusion” 
of the subject in the juridical-political order of the receiving state. On the one hand, 
non-refoulement includes by preventing exclusion. On the other hand, the protected 
status includes by attributing a series of rights to the protected person. The problem 
of “non-returnables” derives from the absence of the latter inclusion. They are 
included by the prohibition of non-refoulement, but excluded for their lack of status.  
This situation of inclusion/exclusion happens because the factual predicate for the 
application of non-refoulement is different from the factual predicate for the 
acquisition of refugee status. Although international and European human rights 
laws provide five cases of non-refoulement, the lack of an international 
complementary status leaves people that are included by non-refoulement, but 
excluded from refugee status to the discretion of each state’s humanitarian 
considerations.     
Article 3 (1) of the 1984 Convention Against Torture textually determines that “no 
State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.” According to the UN Human Rights Committee, Articles 6 – right to life – 
and Article 7 – protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment – of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) create implicit obligations of non-refoulement.17 On the European level, the 
European Court of Human Rights has decided that Article 3 and Protocol 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights implicitly require member-states not to 
                                                          
17 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 2007, p. 9. 
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return someone expected to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or death penalty, respectively.18  
Within this legal framework, the danger of torture, a threat to life and an 
expectation of the infliction of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
or of death penalty are all factual conditions that trigger the consequent “prohibition 
to return.” Any of these conditions would be sufficient for a first inclusion in the 
legal-political order of the receiving state. 
Because the only internationally mandatory protected status is the one regulated by 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, the second inclusion – in terms of international law19 
– can only be operated through the acquisition of refugee status. The problem lies 
on the fact that acquiring refugee status depends on a broader set of conditions. 
According to Article 1 (a) (2) of the Convention, the status only applies to persons 
who  
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country. 
National courts routinely apply this definition with a variety of interpretations. 
Nevertheless, it is textually clear that a person claiming refugee status must prove 
(1) a well-founded fear of being persecuted; and (2) that this persecution would 
occur for one of the reasons listed – race, religion, nationality, membership to a 
particular social group or political opinion. These are the two parts of the factual 
predicate of the refugee status rule.  
                                                          
18 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, 7 
July 1989. For a list of cases asserting this rule see UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement 
Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, footnote 42. 
19 National legal systems may provide discretionary protection, as it will be demonstrated bellow. 
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Although torture, death or cruel, and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, all consist in persecution, they are not enough for fulfilling the factual 
predicate of the refugee status rule. Part (1) of the predicate requires a subjective 
state of mind – the “well-founded fear” – towards the risk of persecution; and part 
(2) requires the persecution to be for specific reasons. Therefore, not every person 
protected by the five rules of non-refoulement necessarily acquires refugee status. 
It is possible that there is a risk of torture, death or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and (1) the person is unable to prove a “well-founded 
fear,” or (2) the persecution is not based on one of the Convention’s reasons.  
Those that fall in one of these two situations are the so-called “non-returnables.” On 
the one hand, they are included in the receiving state’s juridical-political order 
because the factual conditions they face trigger a prohibition of exclusion. On the 
other hand, they are excluded from that same order because these factual 
conditions are not enough to activate the obligation of conferring refugee status 
upon them, and because there is no alternative complementary status available in 
international law.  
This paradoxical situation shows that when we analyze the legal framework of 
international protection as a whole, including all rules of non-refoulement and 
protected statuses available, its gaps – originated by the international community’s 
narrow definition of “refugee” and its silence about an alternative status – reveal a 
mode of operation similar to that of the “sovereign ban.”  
According to Agamben, sovereignty operates through the “logic of 
inclusion/exclusion” of the subject in the juridical-political order. International 
refugee and human rights law reproduce this logic because the relationship between 
subject and order results in the paradox of the simultaneous inclusion through non-
refoulement and exclusion through the lack of a protected status. 
Analyzed through a spatial perspective, the position of “non-returnable” persons 
challenges the distinction between inside and outside. This anomalous figure, 
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produced by the silence of international law, stands in a non-location, or somewhere 
we cannot conceive through traditional accounts of the relationship between order 
and territory. Not inside, nor outside, the “non-returnable” is trapped somewhere 
in-between, a space in which the legal order is suspended, liberating the exercise of 
sovereign power from the boundaries and constrains imposed by a legal status. The 
legally constructed imaginary geography of the “non-returnable” is the “camp,” a 
space where the state of exception finds its permanent location. 
Within this space, “non-returnables” are pure subjectivities without legal status who 
cannot be pushed back to their country of origin. The moment they depart – fleeing 
from threats to their basic rights – represents the disconnection between their “bare 
lives” and the juridical-political order of the state of origin. According to the fiction 
of the immediate application of non-refoulement, this exact moment creates an 
obligation for the receiving state of not returning them. However, the initial 
inclusion is followed – if we may establish a time sequence for analytical purposes – 
by exclusion.  
Although these “bare lives” are “non-returnable,” international law does not 
guarantee them a legal status. The existence of a pure biological life that has lost 
every reference to the juridical-political order, but nevertheless must remain inside 
it reveals that the relationship between order and subject may be described as the 
capture of an exteriority – a living being that is not a legal subject, nor a complete 
outsider. For Agamben, this capture is the original function of sovereignty.  
 
3. EXCLUDED PERSONS 
In 2004, the Council of the European Union enacted a directive creating a 
complementary status for asylum-seekers who do not qualify for refugee status.20 
Although the list of rights guaranteed to the beneficiaries of this alternative status is 
                                                          
20 COUNCIL OF THE EROPEAN UNION. Council Directive 2004/83/EC, April 29th 2004. 
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significantly more restricted than that of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the initiative 
was based on a justifiable purpose: conferring a legal status upon “non-
returnables.”  
The strategy adopted was simple: equating the factual conditions for the acquisition 
of the new status with the factual conditions for the application of the above-
mentioned rules of non-refoulement. Thus, the qualification rule for subsidiary 
protection – the name chosen for this status – applies to those facing a real risk of 
death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Although the European initiative seems admirable, the 2004 directive does not 
guarantee subsidiary protection to every person who needs international protection 
but is incapable of acquiring refugee status. The Council directive contains 
“exclusion clauses” that preclude the acquisition of subsidiary protection even when 
the factual conditions for the application of the qualification rule are fulfilled. In fact, 
the rule’s factual predicate is not simply composed by these factual conditions. It 
encompasses the “exclusion clauses,” meaning that the consequent subsidiary 
status only applies to someone when there is a real risk of the above-mentioned 
human rights violations and, according to Article 17, when there are no serious 
reasons for considering that 
(a) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the 
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect 
of such crimes; 
(b) he or she has committed a serious crime; 
(c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations as set out in the Preamble 
and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations; 
(d) he or she constitutes a danger to the community or to the 
security of the Member State in which he or she is present. 
These clauses may be explained by two different rationales. They might have been 
designed to exclude undesirable people from the receiving community, which means 
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that a national security argument has prevailed to prevent dangerous individuals 
from being part of that community. Or they might have been inserted to prevent 
unworthy people from getting international protection, which means that a moral 
argument has prevailed in the determination of who deserves and who does not 
deserve protection from European law. Either way, there are harmful consequences. 
The rules of non-refoulement of international and European human rights law apply 
to any person facing one of the above-mentioned relevant factual conditions. 
Therefore, even when the person has, for example, committed a serious crime 
(Article 17, b), or when any other “exclusion clause” apply, he or she is protected 
from forced return to a country where he or she would face death penalty, torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. When this person is unable to 
obtain refugee status – for one of the reasons mentioned in section three – and is 
excluded from subsidiary status – due to an exclusion clause -, and cannot be 
returned, he or she stands on the same ambiguous position of “non-returnable 
persons.” Both national security and moral arguments do not preclude the fact that, 
if returned, the dangerous or unworthy individual will suffer human rights violations.  
It is true that the 2004 European directive enables non-returnables to acquire 
almost full inclusion21 in the receiving state’s juridical order. However, the exclusion 
clauses reproduce the “sovereign ban,” perpetuating the “logic of 
inclusion/exclusion.” Apparently, simply filling in the gaps is not the adequate 
approach to the problem.  
National security and moral arguments have played a strong role during the 
elaboration of the directive in order to create new gaps and it is reasonable to 
assume that even if other international or regional norms are created in the future, 
these arguments will continue to prevail and exclude persecuted subjects. It is 
impossible to cover all gaps because the problem lies on the way in which we 
currently think the relationship between sovereignty, territory and life. Only a re-
                                                          
21 The rights conferred upon them are actually more restricted then the rights conferred upon 
Convention refugees. 
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conceptualization of this relationship will pave the way for a potentially all-inclusive 
protection of human life.     
Those who cannot be returned and nevertheless are excluded from refugee and 
subsidiary status are included by the prohibition of refoulement and excluded for 
their lack of status. The legal construction of their location indicates a space that is 
neither outside nor inside, resembling the space of the “camp,” where sovereignty is 
detached from legal restrains and the state of exception is concretized permanently. 
Their lives relate to the juridical order as exteriorities that are captured inside, 
stripped from a legal status and therefore subjected to the receiving government’s 
discretionary considerations. 
            
CONCLUSION 
Within its own territorial space, sovereignty is originally and functionally tied to the 
production of “bare life.” Steven DeCaroli reconstructs the history of the “sovereign 
field” to argue that banishment – and the consequent creation of mere biological 
existences unprotected by the law – is a pre-condition for the establishment of 
predictable and egalitarian juridical-political orders. According to him, sovereignty 
guarantees the factual conditions for obedience by removing the subjects that 
threaten the unity, equality and stability of the state order. However, legal removal 
does not coincide with the physical removal from the state’s territory, but operates 
through the “abandonment of the individual to the dire consequences of the law’s 
complete withdrawal.”22  
In the international arena, undesirable persons are not always physically pushed 
outside territorial borders. When protection gaps leave them to the situations of 
                                                          
22 DECAROLI, Steven. Boundary Stones: Giorgio Agamben and the Field of Sovereignty. In: Calarco & 
DeCaroli (editors). Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 62. 
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non-returnable or excluded persons, they are abandoned to what international legal 
and political discourses construct as the space of humanitarianism.  
Accordingly, if it is not internationally mandatory to confer protection upon an 
individual, when governments actually enforce mechanisms that guarantee them 
some sort of legal status, they are not complying with international law, but making 
a humanitarian gesture to protect human dignity. Many European countries have, 
for example, created mechanisms of complementary protection for persons 
threatened with human rights violations in their countries of origin who are entitled 
to non-refoulement, but cannot obtain refugee or subsidiary status. Those 
instruments are justified as humanitarian gestures towards people in the need for 
protection.23     
To leave lives that are already fragile for their impossibility of returning to their 
country of citizenship to the space of humanitarian considerations means 
abandoning those individuals to discretionary actions that may or may not consist in 
beneficial gestures of protection. The locus of humanitarianism may likewise be 
fulfilled by unconstrained manifestations of sovereign violence.  
Christoph Menke provides a useful framework to think about the connection 
between humanitarianism and sovereign violence. According to him, the sovereign 
suspension of the law consists in two cases of “concrete exception:” dictatorship and 
mercy. Although mercy, for Menke, is a negative act meaning “to abstain from the 
application of the law in the name of somebody,”24 it acquires a positive form 
through, for instance, the humanitarian gesture of conferring a legal status upon a 
frustrated asylum-seeker.  
                                                          
23 For example, Austria’s “Humanitarian Residence Permits,” Italy’s “Residence Permit on Humanitarian 
Grounds” and The Netherland’s “Residence Status for Humanitarian Reasons.” For a comprehensive list 
of these instruments, see EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES. Complementary 
Protection in Europe, 2009. Between May and June of 2009, I was involved in the drafting of this 
report while working at ECRE as a Michigan Fellow in Refugee and Asylum Law. 
24 MENKE, Cristoph. Reflections of Equality. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
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Either way, similarly to dictatorial power, mercy occupies a space that is not filled 
by legal obligations, a space in which sovereign power is exercised without legal 
boundaries. This argument is advanced by Ticktin in her study of how policing – “an 
expression of power with no normative legal constrains” – and humanitarianism are 
“two sides of the same coin” in the crisis of sovereignty that makes French 
immigration law and politics operate through the state of exception.25 If, on the one 
hand, the exceptional space of the humanitarian may reveal surprisingly merciful 
gestures, on the other hand, it may leave fragile lives to the dangerous 
consequences of standing in-between the protection of the law.     
This paper presented the legal construction of those spaces in-between, where the 
relation between sovereignty and life is not mediated by the language of law. When 
international refugee law leaves the protection of persons to the discretionary 
considerations of states, it does not fulfill its function of providing surrogate 
protection to human life. Rather, it simply reproduces the logic of 
inclusion/exclusion that according to Agamben consists in the hidden metaphysics of 
Western politics. Re-thinking the relationship between sovereignty, territory and life 
is the first step for a potentially all-inclusive system of refugee protection. 
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